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There
are two key building blocks in Supreme
Court precedent for an anti-sorting principle-a
principle that would disfavor the alignment of
political with religious boundaries. The first is a case about
exclusion. Upon learning that a Santeria church was planned
for construction within the City of Hialeah, a series of
ordinances was adopted. Part of the Santeria faith calls for
animal sacrifice, and the practical effect of the ordinances
was to outlaw "ritual" animal sacrifice without threatening
kosher butchers. The Court unanimously held the ordinances
invalid. Going out of its way to teach the locals a lesson,
the majority explained that Santeria is a religion for First
Amendment purposes even though the City did not argue
otherwise. The opinion opened with the observation that
local officials "did not understand, failed to perceive, or
chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated
the Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom."
Commentators discuss the Santeria case as a matter of
free exercise, and it is surely that. Presumably the same
result would obtain if the State of Florida or the Federal
Government adopted the same rules for animal sacrifice.
But in the spirit of economist Charles Tiebout-who
pointed out benefits of political jurisdictions responding
to and competing for mobile citizen voters-the Court
might have told the newcomers to sort themselves into a
more-accepting municipality. Or, recognizing that the City
of Hialeah could not have guaranteed Santeria space in any
other jurisdiction, the Court might have distinguished a
hypothetical statewide program that achieved such a guarantee.
But nothing in the Court's decision is so pro-sorting. It
does not suggest that a municipality may expel a disfavored
religion from its territory as long as another municipality
stays open. To the contrary, the opinion-protecting "the
Nation's essential commitment" to religious liberty-indicates
opposition to sect-targeted and government-backed efforts
to achieve local homogeneity. For federal constitutional
purposes, then, religion looks more like race than wealth:
localities may more-or-less explicitly zone for homogeneity
in the latter but not the former. The Court would blanch
at overt government efforts to restrict migration of
African-Americans to select communities even if 99% of
residential property within the region remained open. A
different result seems unlikely for denominations like Santeria.
Even so, the Hialeah decision is not entirely anti-sorting.
In fact it might be read as pro-sorting but anti-subordination.
In the spirit of the Supreme Court's Carotene Products
decision rather than Tiebout, the Court might have been
protecting the interests of non-mainstream religions to
sort themselves however they wish. Perhaps Santeria's
victory means that the local political unpopularity of a
migrant's religion, like her race, is not something she
should have to worry about while sorting. But even with a
useful concept of "minority religion" within a multitude of
faiths, this reading is not quite right. The Court's concern
goes beyond empowering minorities to join a locality that
prefers to maintain its religious composition.
The point is made by a second and more controversial
case. A year after the Hialeah decision, the New York
legislature was rebuked for drawing a new public school
district at the request of the Satmar Hasidim. The district's
boundaries would have matched the Satmars' residential
enclave in the Village of Kiryas Joel, and the Court balked
at officials consciously aligning political institutions with
religious geography. This was true even though both the
Satmars and the adjacent community were probably
grateful for the partition. The former wanted the new
district to provide special education services apart from
non-Satmar students, who were a source of discomfort
and humiliation for their children.
The ramifications of the case are unclear, however. The
decision did not entail invalidation of the Satmars' village,
for example, even though it was religiously homogenous
by any standard. Why not? Dicta indicates that the
Court's worry was that state officials purposefully singled
out the Satmars for special treatment in creating the school
district but not the village. "State action" was needed to
get either one, of course. But the State might have been
too conscious of sectarian beneficiaries in dealing with the
school district, and failed adequately to assure empathy for
similarly situated communities. By contrast, the village's
boundaries were generated by a process facially neutral
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with respect to religion. Any group could seek municipal
status by that process. Ifwe assume the Satmar village is
constitutionally permissible, perhaps the state may facilitate
sorting by all groups, as long as it does not purposefully
facilitate religious sorting. On the other hand, an anti­
subordination principle might re-enter the picture here; it
could restrict the benefits of municipal status for religiously
monolithic communities to systematic losers in the political
process. After all, the Satmars traveled a long way before
reaching Kiryas Joel, ultimately seeking village status to
escape restrictive zoning ordinances burdening
their way of life. The character and dimension of
any principles underlying the case are undefined.
One limit to the Court's opposition to religious
sorting should be emphasized here. The attention
is on religious cleavages that match political
boundaries but not all boundaries will be policed.
This is a fair inference from race cases. A majority
of the Court has been concerned when officials draw
legislative districts to match racial demographics.
Yet dissenters in those cases-all of whom voted
to invalidate the Satmars' special school district­
indicated that religion is a presumptively valid
basis on which to draw legislative districts. The
majority did not disagree on the religion point,
and nobody contended that such districting
needed to relieve religious subordination. Why
the free pass on legislative districts?
A simple explanation turns on the different
functions served by jurisdictional boundaries. In
legislative districting, officials mold the membership of a
decision-making body drawn from a given citizenry. Those
representatives later assemble and make policy. District
lines no doubt affect the legislature's composition, but
homogeneity within districts will not necessarily have a
serious impact on influence within the assembly. In drawing
state and municipal boundaries, however, the citizenry
itself is defined. This is important as long as state and local
governments retain significant decision-making authority
of their own. And homogeneity within such polities is
undeniably connected to influence over what is taught in
public schools, who enjoys exemptions from regulation,
which books show up in public libraries, who runs the
local courts, and so on. Religious anti-sorting principles
are aimed at the manufacture of such polities.
SORTING EXPERIMENTS AND LEGAL CHANGE
Details aside, the Satmar and Santeria decisions indicate
that special government efforts to promote religious
homogeneity are sometimes invalid. But can we justify,
or at least account for, the precedent? Is there a legitimate
constitutional foundation for anti-sorting principles?
Arguments from plain text or original meaning at the
founding are unlikely suspects. The First Amendment's
religion clauses were drafted as restraints on "Congress"
and, by logical extension, the rest of the federal government.
The posture of state and local governments toward religion
was an issue for them to resolve. As such, the Federal
Constitution of 1791 was at most agnostic about religious
sorting. And the explicit promise that Congress
would make no law "respecting" an establishment
of religion made the document arguably pro-sorting.
Whatever else the clause meant when ratified, it
indicated restraints on the ability of the federal
government to interfere with state religious
"establishments." So a constitutional anti-sorting
norm depends on movement since 1791. The
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment and
subsequent constitutional theory is examined
below. However, the argument should begin with
government policy predating the Constitution
and the dramatic legal change thereafter. This
history is sufficiently intriguing that countless
scholars have traced and retraced it. But major
developments that are crucial from a sorting
perspective are not highlighted in contemporary
legal scholarship.
The fact is that our country ran an extended
experiment with religious sorting policies at the
state and local level. These experiments were intimately
associated with official religious "establishments," and they
did not survive. This history is commonly seen as a regrettable
episode of intolerant deprivations of religious liberty and
equality-a misstep to be forgiven in light of a population
so much less diverse than today's. But that homogeneity
was partly the result of purposeful official efforts to sculpt
religious demographics in the New World. Religious
• establishments were part of a dynamic migration system.
Less-welcoming atmospheres tend to ward off the less-welcome,
while attracting the favored class. A religious-sorting
perspective on American history emphasizes these dynamics.
The British colonies provided havens for Protestants, who
had strong incentives to sort themselves out of Europe, and
for those who thought the Church of England was corrupt.
The colonies were sometimes advertised as such. At the
same time, these outposts executed the most severe forms of
intolerance against other faiths. Certainly part of the story is
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about religious liberty simpliciter. Regulation of religious
practices, such as rules limiting who could preach or
perform legally recognized marriage ceremonies, were
obviously impositions on minorities within a given colony.
But such regulation and promotion also were mechanisms
that encouraged sorting during periods of mass migration.
For a time, some colonies even adopted immigration laws to
exclude or deport those of the wrong religion. A Virginia
policy excluded Catholics and Puritans; Massachusetts Bay
Colony banished Quakers and others. In the latter case,
Quakers faced the death penalty for returning to
Massachusetts, not simply for their heresy. The
Colony preferred conformity, to be sure, but the
primary tool seems to have been population
control rather than conversion.
These formal exclusions were abandoned before
separation from the Crown, but efforts to shape
the religious population continued. Several early
state governments officially preferred sets of
religious beliefs and practices. For example, South
Carolina's 1778 Constitution declared Protestantism
the State's established religion. To achieve
incorporated status, religious societies would have
to agree that Christianity is the "true religion,"
the New Testament is "of divine inspiration," and
there is a "future state of rewards and punishments."
Such provisions were liberal compared to colonial
policy, but they still made statements about the
religious commitment expected of inhabitants.
More important, some colonies and states taxed
people for the specific purpose of funding preferred
churches or ministers. Virginia famously ran such a system
for a time. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire
authorized municipalities to select a minister for tax-and­
transfer, thereby further decentralizing without rejecting
religious establishments. From a sorting perspective, these
programs might be superior to immigration laws. The latter
must have been difficult to enforce insofar as religious
commitments can be sustained ..without social visibility-a
fact that helps explain severe penalties for return after
banishment. A tax, in contrast, can be levied on all or
many residents and the proceeds then directed to an identifiable
religious organization or figure. In other words, officially
preferred beneficiaries were probably easier to identify than
disfavored religionists. In addition, financing schemes that
allowed people to opt out, or to direct their tax contribution
to minority religions, can also facilitate sorting. To choose
one of these options is to identify oneself as a dissident.
Adherents to minority religions might well prefer to remain
anonymous, and so either conform or go elsewhere.
Not all states aimed to be narrowly sectarian enclaves.
One could avoid the Congregational influence in New
England and the Anglican establishments of some Southern
states by settling in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or
Rhode Island. They billed themselves as relatively open
political societies. The variance in church-state policies
offered choices of politico-religious culture. Many people
must have made decisions accordingly. Forced to characterize
the early American law of religion as anti-liberty
or pro-sorting, one could easily favor the latter.
Either way, the formal establishments soon
collapsed. Any Anglican establishment was poorly
situated to outlive the Revolution. Other schemes
failed as well. For instance, South Carolina's
pro-establishment clauses were repealed in 1790.
Massachusetts' system of locally established faiths,
which outlasted all the other formal establishments,
was abolished in 1833. Buffeted by immigration,
additional sources of religious diversity, and
competing economic interests, the impulse for
religiously closed states softened. Inter-faith
animosity was not eliminated, of course. Ifnothing
else, the experience of Catholics in the nineteenth
century defeats that claim. And religiously restrictive
.covenants were used to shape local demographics
long after the original establishments were
discontinued. Yet the idea of state-orchestrated
partition of religious groups seems to have lost
legitimacy in relatively short order.
In fact, a sign of the change can be found in a passage
ofJustice Harlan's dissent in Plessey v. Ferguson. It put
state-mandated religious segregation on a list of shocking
hypotheticals that the supporters of racial segregation
were challenged to distinguish:
[I] f this statute of Louisiana is consistent with
the personal liberty of citizens, why may not the
state require the separation in railroad coaches
of native and naturalized citizens of the United
States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?
This statement might support only a narrow anti-sorting
rule, involving legally coerced segregation by religion. But
it's a start.
ANTI-SORTING IN THEORY
Entrenching every perceived resolution of political conflict
is no way to do constitutional law, of course. Anti-sorting
principles need arguments to distinguish them from other
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trends. As a matter of constitutional text, the critical
sources are the state-restraining provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But because that text is so underspecified, and
because its inspiration was chattel slavery, a religion-oriented
anti-sorting norm must be reinforced with a broader or
different constitutional theory. This is not the place for a
fully articulated sorting theory or an end to the "incorporation"
debate. Normative and empirical uncertainties strongly
caution against a robust anti-sorting principle, anyway. Yet
with a little effort, we can see the structure of the argument.
And this structure will further the equally challenging task
of grinding out concrete versions of the principle.
There are two promising routes to a constitutional
anti-sorting principle. Both rely on implications of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Reconstruction. The first
route is conventional yet synergistic. The concept of "law
respecting an establishment of religion" would be borrowed
from the First Amendment and converted into a prohibition
on state action by one or more clauses in the Fourteenth.
The second route does not directly rely on First Amendment
concepts. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment itself
underwrites an anti-sorting norm. Either way, the argument
is above and beyond the particularities of establishment
clause interpretation. These two lines of the argument can
then be joined with modern political theory, concern for
consequences, and empirical data.
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
The first path depends on certain understandings of both
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The latter explicitly
restrains state action in multiple ways that might be relevant:
protecting privileges or immunities, guaranteeing liberty
with due process, demanding equal protection of the laws;
even the grants of national and state citizenship can be relied
on. A free-exercise norm, moreover, fits easily within these
concepts. There is even Fourteenth Amendment drafting
history to that effect. Excluding people or organizations
from states or municipalities, such as Hialeah's attempt to
prevent Santeria's immigration, is thus relatively easy to
prohibit under the Fourteenth Amendment. The result in
the Santeria case shielded a sect from a ritual-targeting
government prohibition. But for discretionary beneiits like
a school district for the Satmars, the constitutional problem
is harder to see (at least if equal protection norms are
satisfied). In some ways the new district promoted religious
liberty-perhaps not a system of liberty in which multiple
sects thrive and interact, but surely the religious autonomy
of the Satmars was served. It is not even clear that the new
district would have required substantial additional tax dollars
from outsiders who might object. This suggests that more
must be done to articulate a non-establishment norm that
plausibly can be appropriated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
After all, the establishment clause of the First Amendment
was a federalism-promoting concession to the states that
resists an easy transplant into the Fourteenth.
The best argument on this track is that the American
view of religious establishments changed between 1791
and 1868. Perhaps it moved from local option to liberty
killer. Even ignoring stare decisis, there is material to support
this thesis. However disconnected disestablishment was
from the notion of religious liberty at the founding, these
ideas were sometimes coupled by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified. In fact, a few state and territorial
constitutions even mimicked the federal establishment
clause and its "law respecting" language. Thomas Cooley's
1868 treatise summarized state constitutions in just those
terms. It is extremely unlikely that these clauses reflected
yet another structural decision to decentralize religious
questions to municipalities, and they were certainly not
cross-jurisdictional protection for other states. A better
explanation lies in the shift away from formal establishments
among the original states, along with changing political
values in the West. Government was by no means disconnected
from religion in the 1800s; part of the allergy to "church"­
state connection, moreover, was anti-Catholicism that
accompanied new waves of international immigration. But
sub-national "establishments" became incompatible with
prevailing notions of the proper relationship between
government and religion. And we now know that sorting
accompanied state and colonial programs regarding religion,
we might conclude that government-propelled religious
messages are a component of any "establishment" worthy
of the name, and we are in any case much closer to placing
an anti-sorting norm within the Fourteenth Amendment.
Once the values of deregulated religious liberty and
non-establishment are imported, anti-sorting is not only a
matter ofhistorical analogy. The principle may be prophylactic,
and here there is a connection with anti-proselytism.
Monitoring the conduct of officials within local religious
enclaves can be difficult. Without effective monitoring,
however, these enclaves can disrupt political choices at the
state and national levels. Furthermore, sorting will often
be imperfect. This was true even under colonial regimes.
Religious faith can be relatively invisible if an individual so
chooses, while non-religious reasons plainly affect location
decisions. Thus a municipality dominated by one sect
might still have non-conformists to deal with. Leaving the
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law to such imperfectly sorted religious enclaves can
therefore threaten social policy. Nor is the threat restricted
to sectarian proselytizing and ostracism. There is likewise
reason to worry that imperfectly sorted secular enclaves
will disregard constitutional guarantees of religious liberty.
And the more generous one is with free exercise rights, the
more worried one should be about secular dominance
within a political community. As such the sectarian vision
of Republic, Missouri in the 1990s was not categorically
different from the atheistic aspiration of Liberal, Missouri in
the 1880s-a Town more than happy to declare its official
opinion that "MAN'S SAVIOR MUST BE MAN ALONE."
Fears persist, moreover, even when sorting is complete.
A nightmare scenario is suggested by charges against the
Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints in Colorado City, Arizona. Members allegedly
sorted themselves into relative isolation, minimized access
to communications technology, taught theories of racial
superiority, subordinated girls to patriarchal domination,
banished hundreds of teenage boys to maintain a gender
imbalance for polygyny, used government officials to
further Church diktats concerning romantic relationships,
and diverted tax dollars intended for public schools to
Church operations. In fact, "diversion" loses meaning in
this context. If critics are correct about Colorado City,
local government authority is now an arm of the Church
and wielded to achieve religious goals. This fits any plausible
definition of religious establishment. Separation of church
and state might be a poor slogan for the establishment clause,
but church-state integration is certainly not the vision.
Anyway, the important argument for anti-sorting principles
is that religious homogeneity makes such constitutional
violations more likely. And in an interconnected society
with a substantial welfare state, "complete exit" of religious
groups is more difficult to achieve.
Religious sorting therefore should be most distressing to
those who support robust versions of anti-establishment
norms. However appealing one might think it to rope
off "the government" from religious symbols, religious
justifications for public policy, and subsidies benefiting
religious institutions, those goals will be harder to obtain
if the community is monolithically dedicated to one version
of religious faith. All the more so at the local level where
the public/private line, often by design, is faintest.
The argument for a principle disfavoring religious sorting
is bolstered by an alternative path. Post-Reconstruction
ideals of citizenship and nationalism may support it.
Kenneth Karst is a leader here. He forged a theoretical
REPUBLIC
Growing With The Ozarks
After running a contest for a city flag and seal, the local
government for the City of Republic in southwestern Missouri
chose an elliptical shape with symbols in four quadrants. On
the bottom half were images of a traditional nuclear family and
a fish, or ichthys, commonly associated with Christianity
The seal was displayed on city buildings, city vehicles, city
stationery, and city-limit signs. A local minister declared that
the ACLU had correctly associated the ichthys with Jesus
Christ, adding, "I say the line is drawn. Stay out of Republic.
We're going to stand for Christian principles.
"
connection between race and religion through the concept
of equal citizenship. He did so in service of nationalism­
some bare minimum of national identity and civic unity in
a multicultural country, which stands against exclusionary
or polarizing use of race and religion in politics. Race might
be more salient in America, but religion is another tool
with which politicians and officials can divide the country.
Engineering a desired composition of religion within a
political boundary is a literal example of this feared partition.
And one can reach these conclusions without specifying
the best interpretation of the First Amendment.
Yet insofar as racial sorting implicates fears of perpetual
subordination, religious sorting is distinct. Perhaps few
believe that race is a normatively defensible category for
many purposes and all else equal, instead of a social fact or
a tool for organizing disadvantaged groups. But religion is
another story. It is far more difficult to demonstrate that
society would be better offwith the extermination of
religion as a category. Furthermore, free-exercise values
suggest that the Constitution prefers liberated religiosity.
The Reconstruction Amendments, in contrast, are tough
to read as promoting racial identity for its own sake or
even for instrumental purposes. Anti-sorting would get more
mileage out of a theory treating religion as constitutionally
valued and religious divisions as indissoluble.
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The conventional legal logic begins to stretch thin, but
perhaps the nationalizing influence of the Civil War's
resolution supports a neo-Madisonian theory of religious
faction. Madison's now-hackneyed insight was that the
collection of interests into a single political institution
could facilitate reasoned compromise or at least prevent
factional domination. He applied the theory to religious
sects in The Federalist. But he did not touch state and local
affairs. While Madison promoted federal constitutional
guarantees of religious liberty against the states, he could
not achieve it in the Bill of Rights. Yet the point
is useful for an anti-sorting principle, because it
sees religion as politically powerful rather than
habitually subordinated. It recommends integrating
multiple denominations within political institutions.
And it limits the principle to groups dominating
political jurisdictions, not simple geographic
clumping. Christopher Eisgruber pushes similar
arguments, singling out organized religion from
other interests. Although critical to healthy societal
diversity, he contends, religious groups are often
cohesive, impervious to ordinary rational argument,
and uncompromising because organized on
matters of principle. These characteristics might
be accentuated when reinforced with a matching
political boundary. Those lines can bolster group
loyalty, and the use of government machinery may
help solve any remaining collective action problems.
Such theories might leave little for a local
government to decide, though. Before we take
constitutional law to nationalize the primary school
curriculum, it is worth recalling the virtues of decentralized
democracy. Aside from the hoped-for benefits ofTiebout
sorting, some democrats prefer a measure of decentralized
government power because it creates locations for citizen
participation. The wish is that people develop public­
regarding arguments and interests, rather than simply
presenting individual preferences for aggregation. In addition,
interaction might produce cross-cultural knowledge and
cooperation skills, which could themselves qualify as public ...
goods. Other democrats are not interested in or oppose
the goal of molding citizen interests through local politics,
yet encourage decentralization for other reasons. Even
representative forms of local government can be superior
to wholly centralized power. Local officials might be better
informed about local values and conditions, and local
residents might be better informed about official conduct.
If so, public policy can be more efficiently implemented
and officials can be better monitored.
Neither theory for decentralized democracy is seriously
assisted by religious homogeneity. This is clearer for
participatory democrats. Many of them want citizens to
confront and understand differences, not eliminate them
by political boundaries or social pressure to conform.
Representative democrats also have something to fear from
religious sorting, even if preference homogeneity has
upsides. One problem is group polarization. Given certain
conditions, a group of individuals predisposed toward one
position will end up supporting more extreme
policies after deliberation than would have been
predicted by their pre-deliberation preferences.
In addition, too few dissenters can lead to no
disagreement being voiced at all. And similar
imbalances can generate cascades, as subsequent
evaluations are skewed by prior political victories.
Sometimes these syndromes might happily
produce exciting social experiments. On other
occasions the results might be disastrous, without
a guarantee that the effects will be wholly localized
or that participants will learn much from mistakes.
Representative democracy might dampen the risks
but this seems less likely at the local level. As
political boundaries encompass smaller populations,
representatives and constituents begin to mirror a
single social group. In this sense, secular enclaves
are no different from their religious counterparts.
Lastly, social trends might make an anti-sorting
norm attractive to many integrationists and
nationalists. The country includes undeniably deep cultural
divisions and religion plays a part. Few can believe that the
United States will fit strong versions of the secularization
thesis anytime soon, while empirical work suggests:
• co-religionists are clumped regionally and sometimes
locally-at the county level, perhaps to a degree now
similar to segregation scores for African Americans;
• foreign immigration trends may be contributing to religious
separation, as newcomers sometimes bring shared religious
commitments to geographically distinct communities;
• fundamentalist denominations are gaining proportionally to
other sects; yet the percentage of the population unaffiliated
with any religious institution is substantial, if not growing.
Religious segregation scores are worth pausing over. The
calculations of Professors Paul W Rhode and Koleman S.
Strumpf suggest that, between 1890 and 1990, the nation
became equally segregated at the county level with respect
to religions, African Americans, and the foreign born-with
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the first score falling slightly, the second falling substantially,
and the third recently increasing. A single nationwide
number for "religion" is not obviously comparable with
that for other social categories. The spatial distribution of
many small sects must be aggregated to get a single
segregation score, a handful of larger sects predominate in
respective regions of the country, and our normative
commitments are likely distinct in the religion context.
But segregation indices are not the only relevant data
point. With year 2000 county-level numbers, we can see
that a single denominational family exceeds 50%
of claimed adherents in a large number of counties.
Although the percentage of residents who are
claimed varies significantly across counties, the
numbers may understate geographic unevenness
in terms of anti-sorting concerns. A county that is
relatively "diverse" as a whole might be divided at
a more local level. Cook County, Illinois, to take
a fairly extreme example, includes over 100 cities,
villages, and towns, not to mention dozens more
special purpose districts for education, parks,
libraries, and so on. Strong anti-sorters might care
about each of these divisions.
Some of these trends are untroubling or even
thrilling. Anti-sorting is not anti-diversity; indeed
it could be quite the opposite. The principle is
concerned with how social divisions are
institutionalized. When multiple social cleavages
are piled upon each other, and then reinforced by
coinciding political boundaries, there is cause to
fear an overly fractionated country operating more as a
confederation of monolithic associations than a nation of
people sharing any fundamental commitment.
Likewise, it should be clear that anti-sorting principles
are not anti-religion in a strong sense. Dispersing fellow
believers is not the objective; the worry is alignment of
religious and political borders. A denomination's
geographic concentration is not problematic under the
theory unless, for example, it falls within and dominates a
single political jurisdiction. Furthermore, religious clumping
within a political jurisdiction is not facially problematic if
the jurisdiction as a whole is religiously diverse. The
theory is concerned with monolithic local democracies,
not neighborhoods lacking governmental authority.
Second, the principle does not entail opposition to religion
in politics. One can object to the coincidence of government
institutions and uniform beliefs about religion without
fearing the effects of religiosity on politics. In fact,
anti-sorting is compatible with support for religious
argument within democratic institutions. Yet it does imply
qualms about organized religious factions, which ought to
be accounted for by institutional choice and design.
A preference for mixing cannot achieve universal support,
of course. Religious separatists dedicated to avoiding
communities of sin, secularists convinced that religion is
an infectious fraud, and still others will not be satisfied.
Anti-sorting principles cannot be any more neutral than, say,
basic commitments to liberal democracy. But unmitigated
tolerance seems inconceivable for a functioning
nation, and anti-sorting is consistent with a
liberal goal of relative inclusion.
At the same time, humility is in order. We do
not know all that we reasonably might about the
system of religious sorting in America. In addition,
strong anti-sorting rules are understandably
controversial. Nobody should want an even
distribution of every identifiable denomination
and secular philosophy across every political
jurisdiction. A defensible measure of "religious
diversity," moreover, is not readily available. Nor
will the work done on race smoothly carryover
into the religion context, where the historical,
sociological, and normative differences fall
somewhere between significant and massive.
Tempered measures are in order, especially with
respect to constitutional law enforced by courts.
For now the judicial focus ought to be on religious
homogeneity within political jurisdictions,
official action that consciously and effectively promotes or
entrenches such sorting, and the sorting risks that
accompany other doctrinal choices. Doing this much
would be relatively unambitious yet meaningful. Whatever
are the appropriate doctrinal implications, an anti-sorting
perspective focuses on questions that matter. It pinpoints
live social phenomena in a modern, dynamic, and
religiously diverse nation. This should be a welcome
addition to our continuing search for the proper relationship
between religion and political institutions.
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